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1.  Introduction 
This paper analyzes conflicts in Brazil involving landless peasants, and the 
violence that frequently results from their invasion and occupation of privately-owned 
land, for the period 2000-2008. Land ownership in Brazil is overwhelmingly and 
historically characterized by large, family-owned estates (Pichon, 1997). The unequal 
and inequitable allocation of land
1, together with weak institutions, weak markets and 
low asset endowment, may make land reform a low priority (Binswanger and McIntire, 
1987; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997). In the absence of effective land reforms (Assunção, 
2008; Deininger, 1999) these factors may lead to the occupation of land by the landless 
poor peasants by violent means. In such an environment land-related conflicts are 
common and have been previously analyzed in several studies, with a particular focus 
on Africa (Bruce, Fortmann and Nhira, 1993; Andre and Platteau, 1998; Deininger and 
Castagnini, 2004) and Latin America (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2005).  
Credit rationing is part of the problem, since without credit individuals may not 
be able to undertake indivisible investments, such as purchasing land, which have a long 
period of maturation (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986, 1987). As a result, due to the lack of 
access to credit markets, the poor peasant may fail to escape from poverty by not being 
able to own land (Fenske, 2010)
2.  
The landowners have responded to the threat of land invasion and occupation 
with large-scale evictions, adopting extensive large-scale livestock production and 
                                                 
1 It is recognized by the literature that high land endowment does not correspond to equal distribution of 
land (Brück and Schindler, 2009). 
2 One possible solution for this problem is the development of joint-liability lending institutions such as 
the Grameen Bank, see Ghatak (1999), and Ghatak and Guinnanne (1999).   3
highly-mechanized cultivation methods, which reduce the need for peasant labor on the 
farms, thereby creating obstacles to land reform (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 
1995). In the light of these events, Latin American land reform has been described as a 
lost cause (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989).    
The political orientation of the leadership of organized peasants’ is an important 
determinant of land related violence. The political leadership of the main group of 
landless peasants in Brazil, also known as MST [Landless Peasants’ Movement], is a 
Marxist organization with ties to the Partido dos Trabalhadores [PT, Workers’ Party, the 
political party that has been in power since 2003 under President Luis Ignacio Lula da 
Silva (2003-2010) and now under President Dilma Rousseff]. The MST homepage, 
http://www.mst.org.br/, makes it clear that among its political objectives is the 
destruction of the commercial agriculture in Brazil. Commercial agriculture in Brazil is 
one of the engines of Brazilian growth, and has been very successful. Land reform 
through violence is an essential part of MST strategy to gain power, and is based on the 
Chinese and Cuban ideology and revolutionary experiences. 
The present paper extends the research on land conflict in Brazil by focusing on 
land occupation by farmers without land endowment, analyzing several covariates, such 
as poverty, political effects, population density (Andre and Platteau, 1998) and land 
endowment (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997) to explain 
these occupations.  
Several papers have analyzed violence and land reform in Brazil (Alston, 
Libecap and Schneider, 1995; Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1997, 1999; 2005), 
however the present study is the first to be undertaken at a national level, using a 
contemporary data span. An additional innovation of this study is the use of a count data 
model which allows for heterogeneity, endogeneity and dynamics. Unobserved   4
heterogeneity has been the subject of concern and analysis in many recent works 
(Chesher, 1984; Chesher and Santos-Silva, 2002; McFadden and Train, 2000). This type 
of model is used frequently for data concerning events, and its omission is likely to lead 
to inconsistent parameter estimates or, more importantly, inconsistent fitted parameters. 
Endogeneity also yields estimation problems causing biased results and may arise when 
a covariate is simultaneously determined with the endogenous variable or when a 
covariate is not inserted in the regression (Greene, 2007). A dynamic Poisson model is 
also presented with lags of endogenous variables and leads of exogenous variables, 
enabling a more accurate view of the problem analyzed (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on land 
conflicts. Section 3 describes the contextual background of land conflicts in Brazil. 
Section 4 presents a stylized model that predicts how political, institutional, and 
socioeconomic variables affect violent land occupation. Section 5 presents data and 
methodological issues. Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and section 7 
concludes.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
   A major study on the violent occupation of land by landless peasants in Brazil 
was conducted by Alston, Libecap and Mueller (2005), who analyzed the Brazilian 
Landless Peasants’ Movement. They describe how land invasions led by the Landless 
Peasants’ Movement generated negative publicity for politicians, stimulated broad 
sympathy of urban voters toward the landless and led to further invasions. Alston, 
Libecap and Mueller (2010) develop a multi-principal, multi-task model of interest 
group behavior to examine how groups with limited resources, such as the Landless 
Peasants’ Movement, influence government by manipulating media information to   5
voters. They examine how the Landless Peasants’ Movement in Brazil molds 
information, and study the reaction of politicians in changing the timing and nature of 
policy. Alston and Mueller (2010) find that land conflicts reduce the likelihood of 
tenancy, which results in a reduction in agricultural efficiency, and in welfare of 
potential renters; and an expansion of the agricultural frontier through deforestation. 
Another recent study is Oliveira (2008), who analyzed land conflicts and deforestation 
due to distorted agrarian, forest and environmental policies, laws and regulations in the 
Amazon region
3. 
Other factors such as population growth combined with limited economic 
opportunities may lead to an increase in land invasion and occupation, since they 
increase non-agricultural demand for land and intensify competition for a limited or 
decreasing amount of land available. This could also result in conflicts between groups, 
particularly in environments where risk is high and land is a key asset and source of 
livelihood (Andre and Platteau, 1998). In contrast, property rights and institutional 
frameworks that safeguard these rights decrease land occupation
4.  
      Land  occupation  has  sometimes  been considered a strategic policy in less-
developed countries to thwart far left-wing insurgency (Esteva, 1992). In Brazil, there is 
involvement of the current governing party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers 
Party) and elements of the Catholic Church in land occupation (Simmons et al., 2010). 
According to Ludewigs et al. (2009), land reform in Brazil is a powerful tool in the struggle 
to reduce rural poverty and may attenuate environmental destruction, chiefly in the state of 
Amazonia (Simmons et al., 2010; Pacheco, 2009).   
                                                 
3 On the important issue of Amazon deforestation, see, among others, Cattaneo(2001),  Pacheco (2009); 
Ludewigs et al. (2009); Simmons et al. (2010). 
 
4 Mueller (1997) analyses the role of property rights on land occupation in the frontier, such as the 
Amazon forest.   6
Aspects that characterize the violence related to land reform in general and land 
occupation in particular are contextual variables such as poverty (Waeterloos and 
Rutherford, 2004; Bradstock, 2005; Rigg, 2006), population density (Deininger, 1999; 
Simmons et al., 2010) and land productivity (Minten and Barrett, 2008; Place, 2009). 
Moreover, political forces, like the Brazilian left-wing Workers Party (PT), also shape the 
land reform process (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1997, 1999, 2005). Institutional support 
for land occupations is manifested in measures such as the expropriation of land from the 
landowners by decree (Binswanger and Deininger, 1993 and Pacheco, 2009). Other events, 
such as conflicts over water (Kinsey, 2004; Bakker et al., 2008), actions of resistance to 
land occupation, demonstrations supporting land occupation, generic conflicts related to 
land occupation, attempted murders and death threats are all part of the backdrop to land 
reform and clearly may affect it.  
In Section 4 we elaborate a simple dynamic model that relates land invasion and 
occupation to the above contextual variables. The model yields clear predictions how each 
variable affects violent land invasion and occupation. Prior to that, the next section 
provides detailed information regarding Brazilian land reform and violent land occupations. 
 
3 Brazilian Land Reform and Violent Land Occupations 
  Brazil land tenure is characterized by large, family-owned properties. A federal 
land reform agency, INCRA (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária/the 
National Agency for Land Reform and Settlement) was established in 1969. The 
government allocated funds to buy land and to redistribute it among poor families. 
Since its inception, INCRA engaged in lengthy, bureaucratic processes of land 
expropriation, with an average cost per beneficiary of US$ 58,000. A Federal Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform was created in 1996. Land expropriation was expedited through the   7
a priori selection of the land by community groups, establishing an agreement on a 
willing-seller/willing-buyer basis, paying the landowners in cash and funding the 
endeavors of the new peasant-landholders. The expropriation price per beneficiary 
decreased to US$ 19,600. Grant financing is provided for complementary and 
community infrastructures. The Central Institute for Agrarian Studies was established to 
encourage discussions and research on rural reforms.  A recent survey of Brazilian land 
reform can be seen in Simmons et al. (2010). 
Land reform and rural conflict scenarios in Brazil have changed significantly 
since the creation and growth of landless peasants’ and rural workers’ interest groups, 
most notably the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra/the Landless 
Peasants’ Movement), which was officially founded in 1984, on the departure from 
power of the Brazilian military dictatorship. Alston, Libecap and Mueller (2005), using 
a principal-agent model, describe this transition scenario. 
Prior to the creation of the MST, organizations formed to promote and defend 
the interests of landless peasants and rural workers were too weak to be able to 
influence governmental land reform policies. At the same time, the powerful 
landowners, in contrast, could afford to spend both time and money on efforts to avoid 
expropriation, or to pursue claims for generous compensation from the Government, in 
the event of land reforms actually being enacted. 
Since the emergence of the MST, combined with the spread of urban voters’ 
sympathy for the case of the landless rural workers, political pressure for land reform 
has increased, and, as a consequence, have land-related conflicts. In practice, this 
pressure is applied through social insurgency (farm occupations
5, marches, invasions of 
government offices including INCRA, roadblocks and so on), combined with 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Estado de São Paulo (2009). Members of the MST destroyed 7,000 orange trees on a 
private estate.   8
accusations that the government is failing pledges or is dragging its feet with regard to 
land reform implementation, always with the objective of influencing public opinion by 
way of media coverage. The MST’s political influence through the media channels, as 
described by Alston, Libecap and Mueller (2005), is highlighted below in Chart 1. 
Chart 1 – MST and the Media 
Characteristics Summary 
Low marginal cost to influence the news.  Regardless of voters’ sympathy, the MST 
has the “technological” means to obtain 
extensive media coverage for its activities. 
One of the factors that favorably affect this 
is that the invasions and occupations are 
very labor-intensive, which increases their 
visibility. Another factor is the low 
opportunity cost of landless peasants 
("peasant army reserve"), compared with 
the opportunity cost of farmers. 
Productive efforts to influence the news on 
land reform issues. 
In practice, MST receives more benign 
visibility than farmers. Farmers have not 
achieved the same result in the political 
arena. 
Extreme configuration of voters’ 
preferences. 
Voters are favorable to land reform and 
this is, empirically speaking, a variable 
that increases the popularity of the 
President of the Republic. 
Source: Adapted from Araujo Jr., Shikida and Alvarenga (2008). 
 
Nowadays, a myriad of social movements of the landless peasants exists in 
Brazil, besides the MST, which is the largest and most important. There are various 
splinter movements, such as the CPT (Pastoral Land Commission), the MLT (the 
Struggle for Land Movement, the MLTS (Syndicate of Small Rural Producers), the 
OTC (the Rural Workers Organization) and the STR (Local Rural Workers Unions), all 
adhering to left-wing revolutionary ideology and coupled with regional organizations, 
such as the Movement of Corumbiara Peasants (Simmons et al., 2010).   
The aggressive occupation of private and public lands is justified on the basis of 
the moral authority and constitutional right of the landless peasants (Stedile, 1997;   9
Wolford, 2004). There is evidence that while some original settlers remain on the 
acquired land and develop villages (Ludewigs et al., 2009), others, after fragmenting 
and selling off their plots initially received from INCRA, migrate to new agricultural 
frontiers in order to start the process once again  (Alston, Libecap and Muller, 1999), or 
to urban centers (Bowder and Godfrey, 1997).  
A distinctive aspect of the Brazilian land occupation political movement is the 
role played by the political party currently empowered to govern the nation [PT, 
Workers Party], as well as by the left wing of the Catholic Church.   
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the Brazilian states in relation to the 
problem of land occupation. 
 
<<Insert table 1>> 
Table 1 show that land occupation varies throughout the country, with northern rural 
states more prone to land occupation and related activities than southern states.   
 
4. A Model of Land Invasion and Occupation 
In this section we present a highly stylized model. The objective of the model is 
to illustrate and stress the role, if any, of the factors identified by the empirical literature 
on land conflicts play in increasing or reducing land invasion. The present model 
provides a platform to hypothesis testing; it is not an end in itself.  
The representative agent in the model is a landless peasant. The peasant’s 
problem is to maximize his welfare over time subject to the dynamics of land invasion 
and occupation, dt dL L / ≡
•
. Land invasion and occupation, as seen in the previous 
section, is a social phenomenon related to organized political movements that the   10
individual landless peasant may chose to join or not. This explains why in the model 
below land occupation is a state rather than a control variable.  
The dynamics of land invasion and occupation depends on the differences 
between forces pro, given by a function F, and against land invasion and occupation 
captured by function G. Functions F and G are defined below.  
The working forces for land invasion and occupation are described by function 
F. As arguments of function F we have: 1) The expected return of occupied land; 2) 
Political support for land occupation; 3) Conflicts over common resources, and 4) 
Agricultural credit funded by a public agency.  
Regarding the expected return of occupied land, if the peasant thinks that 
occupied land L, yields a produce f(L) that is enough for his current welfare, as captured 
by a desired consumption level c, that is, if f(L)-c>0, then this can lead him to join the 
movement and invade and occupy privately-owned lands.  
In the same vein, every type of political support for land reform, represented by 
p, such as governments ruled by left-wing political parties, active land reform carried 
out by the government, organized political movements, and organized political violence 
for land reform, increase function F, since the peasant feels more confidence in 
invading because the risk of punishment for it is smaller. 
 Conflicts over the management of common resources, represented by a, such as 
water allocation, can spillover and become a political issue, increasing calls for land 
reform and making the peasant more likely to invade.  
Agricultural credit funded by a public agency, A, stimulates land invasion 
because the provision of credit is attached to the land obtained either by legal land 
distribution or by land obtained through organized and politically motivated land 
invasion. Therefore it fuels land invasion.   11
Given the above discussion, function F has the following characteristics: 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , ) , , , ) ( ( 4 3 2 1 > > > > − F F F F A a p c L f F  
In what follows we will need the specific second direct partials of the function 
F:0 , 0 , 0 , 0 14 13 12 11 < < < = F F F F ; i.e., political participation, conflicts over common 
resources, and agricultural credit funded by a public agency reduce the marginal impact 
of the expected return of occupied land on F. 
The forces against land invasion and occupation are captured by function G. The 
arguments of function G are: 1) Agricultural production, wL, where w is unit value of 
production per unit of land L, 2) Peasant poverty, m; 3) Probability of successful land 
occupation, v; and 4) Rural population density, n. 
Agricultural production reduces land invasion and occupation since it uses land, 
and employs labor, hence increasing the opportunity cost of land invasion for a landless 
peasant. Related to agricultural production is the issue of land eviction of peasants by 
land owners. In order to decrease the risk of land conflicts landowners can reduce the 
demand for labor by mechanizing agriculture and/or adopting extensive large-scale 
livestock production. Of course this is an immiserizing growth process for the peasant 
population in which more evictions lead to more poverty, m, of the landless peasants. 
According to this line of reasoning, productive privately-owned land is more difficult to 
be invaded and occupied, so at least locally, poverty of the peasant population is 
associated with less land invasion and occupation.  
Uncertainty of land occupation is an important factor influencing the decision to 
invade land. If the probability of successful land invasion and occupation, v, is high, the 
peasant decides to join a peasants’ movement and invade land, otherwise he will not 
join and invade land. For instance, if the government reacts to land invasion enforcing 
the rule of law, and preserving the landowners’ property rights, then the landless   12
peasant has less incentive to invade. In the same vein, if rural landowners fight 
invasions back, by reinforcing the protection of their properties, this may increase the 
uncertainty, and reduce land invasions. 
Given the above discussion, the function G has the following characteristics: 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , ) , , , , ( 4 3 2 1 < > > > G G G G n v m wL G  
the second direct partials of the function G: 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 14 13 12 11 > < < < G G G G ; i.e., 
function G is concave in agricultural production; in addition poverty and uncertainty 
reduce the marginal impact of the agricultural production on G, and population density 
increases it. 
  The landless peasant problem is: 
dt t c U Max
c





s.t.  () ( ) v n m wL s G A a p c L f F L , , , , , , , ) ( − − =
•
  (1) 
where the landless peasant preferences for consumption over time are represented by the 
utility integral, the instantaneous utility function U(c) is nonnegative and a concave 
increasing function of the consumption, c;  θ is the landless peasant rate of time 
preference, and f(L) is a production function,  0 , 0 < > LL L f f , where labor is supplied 
inelastically. The current value Hamiltonian associated with the problem is: 
() ( ) {} v n m wL G A a p c L f F c U , , , , , , ) ( ) ( − − − = Η λ     (2) 
Where λ is the costate variable, the shadow price of land invasion and occupation, L, for 
the landless peasant. The first order conditions are: 
0 ) , , , ) ( ( ) ( 1 = − − A a p c L f F c Uc λ                                    (3) 
)] , , , ( ) ( ) , , , ) ( ( [ 1 1 v n m wL wG L f A a p c L f F L − − − = −
•
λ θλ λ         (4) 
In the steady state: 
• •
= = L 0 λ  in equations (1) and (4), we have:   13
() ( ) v n m wL G A a p c L f F , , , , , , ) ( = −                              (5) 
) , , , ( ) ( ) , , , ) ( ( 1 1 v n m wL wG L f A a p c L f F L + = − θ         (6) 
Equations (5) and (6) determine simultaneously the steady state equilibrium 
values of consumption, c*, and land invasion and occupation, L*. With c* and L*, then 
eq. (3) determines λ, the shadow price of land invasion and occupation. By using 
explicit functions for F, G and U, we can obtain explicit expressions for c* and L*.  
Our focus, however, is to investigate the impact of poverty m, agricultural 
productivity w, population density n, political support for land occupation p, probability 
that successful land invasion and occupation, v, water conflict a, and agricultural credit 
A, on equilibrium land invasion and occupation, L*. Assuming 22
2
1 G w f F LL >  , the 
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According to the comparative statics analysis [(7)-(13)] equilibrium land 
invasion and occupation L* increases with population density n, political support for   14
land occupation p, water conflict a, and agricultural credit funded by a public agency, A. 
Land invasion and occupation decreases with poverty m, agricultural productivity w, 
and uncertainty, v. In the following empirical part of this paper we test these predictions 
of the model. 
 
5. Methodological Framework and Hypotheses 
The following variables are considered in the empirical estimations of our 
model: percentage of poverty in the state, agricultural productivity, population density, 
state governed by the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers Party), lands allocated by 
decree, agricultural credit, water conflicts, resistance events, demonstrations, murder 
attempts, number of land conflicts, number of murders related to land reform and the 
number of death threats related to land reform, The data is a panel data by Brazilian 
state  in the period 2000-2008. Table 2 presents the characteristics of the data used. 
 
<<Insert table 2>> 
  
The number of land occupation actions is of paramount importance for its 
strategic management. Our analysis includes a count data model to identify statistical 
significant covariates in the sample (Greene, 2005).  The research utilizes data from the 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra, a Catholic organization that supports poor peasants and 
landless farmers (http://www.cptnac.com.br/?system=news&eid=6), supplemented with 
additional variables from other sources (Ipeadata - http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). 
According to the theoretical model, land occupation depends on: 
   15
H1 (PT): States governed by the left-wing PT- Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers 
Party) increases land occupation.  This effect is based on ideological preferences by left-
wing parties for equity over efficiency, inducing the occupation of the lands owned by 
absentee landlords (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1997, 1999, 2005; Araujo Jr, Shikida 
and Alvarenga, 2008).  
 
H2 (INCRA): Lands allocated for reform by decree by INCRA, tend to validate a 
posteriori land invasion and occupation, fueling further land occupations.  This problem 
has been analyzed by Binswanger and Deininger (1993) and Pacheco (2009). 
 
H3 (PRONAF): Agricultural credit funded by a public agency PRONAF (National 
Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture/Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da 
Agricultura Familiar – a program of Ministry of Agricultural Development that finances 
individual projects or groups of farmers and agrarian reform settlers), tends to support 
land occupation, being with hypothesis 4 and 5 part of the political process that the left 
wing government has established to promote land occupation.  
 
H4 (Poverty): Poverty decreases land occupation, this variable is often used to study 
land conflicts ( Lóapez and   Valdés, 2000;  Waeterloos and Rutherford, 2004; 
Bradstock, 2005;  Finan et al., 2005;  Rigg, 2006).  
 
H5  (Agricultural productivity): Agricultural productivity generates more wealth and 
food supply in the state and therefore it decreases land invasion and occupation.  It is 
often used in land reform models (Caviglia-Harris, 2003; Minten and Barrett, 2008; 
Place, 2009).   16
 
H6 (Population density): Rural population density increases land occupation. It is 
frequently use in land reform models (Deininger, 1999; Simmons et al., 2010) 
 
H7 (Water conflicts): Conflicts over water management, such as those arising from 
severe shortages in semi-arid states in Northeastern Brazil, increase land occupation 
(Kinsey, 2004; Bakker et al., 2008).  
 
H8 (Resistance Actions and Demonstrations): Resistance actions and demonstrations 
are indicators of political determination to invade and occupy land, which help reducing 
the uncertainty on the success of land invasion. Although these variables have not been 
used in previous research of land reform, they are intrinsically part of the process of 
land occupation.  
 
H9 (Murder Attempt and Death threats): The number of individual land conflicts, such 
as murder attempts and death threats, are generic aspects of individual aspects of land 
occupation, usually occurring prior to the land occupation and derived from land 
evaluation by the occupiers (Soares, 2004; Kinsey, 2004; Peters, 2009), and serve to 
decrease land occupations since they increase the uncertainty of successful land 
invasion.  
 
In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, we first estimate an OLS model 
that serves as a reference for the Poisson model. The motivation to use the Poisson 
model is derived from the fact that the dependent variable is the number of times that 
the Landless Peasants’ Movement invades privately-owned land (Cameron and Trivedi,   17
1998; Winkelmann, 2008). This variable is a counting variable that is characterized by 
being non-negative, which should be modeled as a Poisson or a negative binomial 
model (Greene, 2005)
6.  
The Poisson model is based on the hypothesis that the endogenous variable yi 
(counts of the number of land invasions), given the covariates x, is independent with 
Poisson distribution and probability density function. 
It is currently assumed that the basic Poisson model is too restrictive with regard 
to the features of the observed data (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Common deviations 
from the basic Poisson model are: (i) endogeneity (ii) dynamic nature of data, and (iii) 
over-dispersion. Endogeneity occurs when there is a correlation between the exogenous 
variable and the error term, it can also arise as a result of measurement error, 
simultaneity, omitted variables, and sample selection errors (Greene, 2005). Another 
cause of endogeneity lies on the dynamic nature of the data and the autocorrelated 
errors, justifying the dynamic analysis of the data (Greene, 2005).  
Over-dispersion is the failure to equal the conditional mean and conditional 
variance restriction. If the conditional variance of the data exceeds the conditional 
mean, over-dispersion is present. The most commonly given explanation for over-
dispersion is the unobserved heterogeneity in the data, i.e. there are omitted variables in 
the mean function. Other explanations are measurement errors in explanatory variables 
and the stochastic character of the structural parameters. A common approach to 
overcoming this problem is to estimate Poisson models allowing for heterogeneity in 
the mean (Greene, 2005), or to estimate a random Poisson model.  
The empirical strategy follows these procedures estimating after the OLS model 
a standard Poisson Model (e.g., Hilbe, 2008). Then we estimate a Poisson model with 
                                                 
6 Counting models in development economics include Plümper and Neumayer (2009).   18
heterogeneity. We also estimate a Poisson model with endogeneity, (Mullahy, 1997; 
Nichols, 2007). Finally, a dynamic Poisson model is estimated to investigate some 
effects such as lags of endogenous variables and leads of exogenous variables.  
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 presents the results. The Stata software was used to estimate the model. The 
first model is the OLS presented as a reference. The second column presents a standard 
Poisson model. The third model is the random Poisson model allowing for 
heterogeneity. The fourth model is the endogenous Poisson model allowing for 
endogeneity in the political variables, namely PT, INCRA, PRONAF, poverty and 
productivity. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Poisson 
regression is adopted allowing for endogenous variables to be instrumented by excluded 
instruments. Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping. Prior to estimate the 
endogenous model a Hausman test was performed which reached the value of 28.16 
with a small p-value signifying that there was endogeneity in the variables. We then run 
the model without each possible endogenous variable such as possible political induced 
land invasion (PT, INCRA, PRONAF) and contextual induced land invasion (poverty, 
agricultural productivity and population density) and concluded that the endogenous 
variables are PT, INCRA and PRONAF. The instrumental variables were adopted using 
the percentage of state PT municipal heads in the state total, total agricultural bank 
credit in the state and each variable lag.  
Finally the fifth model is a dynamic Poisson model allowing for leads and lags in 
the variables, estimated by a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
 
<<Insert table 3>>   19
  
The first fact that we observe in the results is that almost all signs of variables 
are maintained throughout the various models. Based in the loglikelihood the dynamic 
Poisson is chosen. In the dynamic Poisson model it is verified that lags in the 
endogenous variable are statistically significant meaning that this is a process with 
persistence. The dummy variable PT, which indicates the left wing party controls the 
state, is positive and significant, which means that it contributes to land occupation. 
INCRA is also positive, which signifies that number of lands taken from landowners by 
decree induce land occupation. Agricultural credit also increases land occupation, 
however this variable is not endogenous. The fact that agricultural credit is not 
endogenous means that it contributes to the process through market dynamics, after the 
property rights are allocated to the occupant. 
  The first conclusion is that land occupation in Brazil is explained by the 
political variables such as political support by the party in power to land occupation, 
institutional support by public entities through INCRA that expropriates the occupied 
land from the landowners by decree, and agricultural credit by a public agency. Note 
that INCRA and PRONAF variables have statistical significant leads, which add to the 
statistical significant lag of the endogenous variable meaning this is an ongoing process 
with persistence. These results validate hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. 
The second result is that Poverty is found to be statistically significant in 
reducing land occupation, validating previous research (Waeterloos and Rutherford, 
2004) and also validating Hypothesis 4. Thus poverty restricts land occupation.  
The third result is that productivity in agriculture decreases land occupation, 
validating Hypothesis 5, i.e., high agricultural productivity increases peasants’ income 
and therefore decreases the need for land ownership through land occupation.     20
Population density increases land occupation, validating Hypothesis 6 and suggesting 
that it is among the main causes of land reforms in developing countries (Hidalgo et al., 
2010).  
Conflicts over water management are not statistically significant and decrease 
land occupation, which does not confirm Hypothesis 7. Resistance and demonstrations 
increase land occupation, validating Hypothesis 8. Finally, murder attempts and death 
threats have a mixed effect on land occupation, not validating Hypothesis 9, and 
implying that fear and uncertainty about the success of land invasion has a mixed effect 
on land conflicts.  
The general conclusion is that land occupation in Brazil is explained by the political 
variables such as political support (PT party support), and institutional support for land 
reform (INCRA expropriates the occupied land from the landowners by decree), 
agricultural credit, and economic and social variables such as rural population density, 
poverty and agricultural productivity, collective struggle (resistance actions, 
demonstrations and conflicts). 
The policy implication of this research is that the government should use its 
institutional framework to minimize conflicts and conduct land reform where it is 
necessary under the strict rule of the law. The government has to reduce the power of 
peasants’ political movements that feed on violence by not granting property rights to 
invaders of privately-owned land. The land reform has to reinforce property rights, 
rather than oppose them. For example, Brazil’s Land Statute (Federal Law, Nr. 4.504, 
November, 1964) prevents the expropriation by the Government of lands that have 
suffered invasion. The rule of law is of paramount importance. If the government, for 
political reasons, aims at maintaining political support from these peasants’ movements 
with a clear revolutionary agenda, like the MST, and, at the same time, does not   21
reinforce property rights, and the rule of law, it sends a mixed message that fuels 
violence
7.  
According to our results the Landless Peasants’ Movement focuses on regions with 
less poverty, greater population density, and higher agricultural productivity to invade 
and occupy land. This of course may disrupt production in the main agricultural regions 
of Brazil. The government has to preserve the highly productive areas from disruption 
caused by land invasions. One possible strategy is to explicitly designate and allocate 
appropriate areas [e.g., low productivity areas or unproductive and publicly owned land] 
for land reform. 
How does the present research compare with previous research on Brazilian land 
reform? It provides a specific and unique insight into the land reform movement, based 
on the actions of the Landless Peasants’ Movement, focusing on contextual and conflict 
variables, giving a clear view of the factors that influence violence. Compared with 
earlier research on Brazilian land reform this paper’s use of data for the entire country 
and estimation methods that take care of heterogeneity, endogeneity and dynamics 
enables a more accurate view of the land reform movement. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes land occupation and land reform process in Brazil for the period 
of 2000-2008. This is the first study to be undertaken at a national level, with a 
contemporary data span, using a count data model that allows for heterogeneity, 
endogeneity and dynamics. It studies contextual variables that affect land occupation, 
such as political, institutional, conflict and socio-economic variables. It shows that 
political and institutional variables have a positive effect on land occupation. However, 
                                                 
7 Our policy prescriptions do not consider a political equilibrium. In Alston, Libecap and Mueller (2010) 
the political equilibrium is that the government will concede to the MST given its ability to mold 
information available to urban voters so as to generate broad urban support for its land reform agenda.   22
the socio-economic variables have a mixed effect, with rural population density 
increasing land occupations, while poverty, and land productivity reduce land 
occupations. Conflict variables also have mixed effects, with resistance movements, 
demonstrations and generic conflicts increasing land invasion and occupation, while 
water-related conflicts, murder attempts and death threats cause their decrease.  
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by decree  Population 
Acre 0  0.224  6  680073 
Alagoas 20  0.212  5  3127557 
Amapá 0  0.109  0  613164 
Amazonas 1  0.165  0  3341096 
Bahia 28  0.151  22  14502575 
Ceará 4  0.186  12  8450527 
Distrito Federal  0  0.000  16  2557158 
Espírito Santo  2  0.034  2  3453648 
Goiás 10  0.034  21  5844996 
Maranhão 1  0.228  11  6305539 
Mato Grosso  1  0.042  6  2957732 
Mato Grosso do Sul  6  0.028  2  2336058 
Minas Gerais  10  0.032  15  19850072 
Pará 17  0.104  12  7321493 
Paraíba 10  0.165  25  3742606 
Paraná 14  0.036  1  10590169 
Pernambuco 52  0.172  15  8734194 
Piauí 0  0.204  27  3119697 
Rio de Janeiro  2  0.040  2  15872362 
Rio Grande do Norte  1  0.142  5  3106430 
Rio Grande do Sul  11  0.042  13  10855214 
Rondônia 3  0.096  0  1493566 
Roraima 1  0.117  0  412783 
Santa Catarina  5  0.013  4  6052587 
São Paulo  49  0.029  4  41011635 
Sergipe 3  0.142  10  1999374 
Tocantins 1  0.120  8  1280509 
Mean 9  0.106  9  7022696.815 
Std. deviation  13  0.073  8  8422434.611 
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Table 2:  Data Descriptive Analysis 
variables Description  Mean Std.  dev.  Min. Max. 
Occupation 
Number of 
occupations 12.736  19.885  0 165 
Political and Institutional  context 
PT 
Dummy equal to one 
if PT governs the 
state 0.127  0.334  0  1 
INCRA 
Number of lands 
taken from 
landowners by decree 10.13  12.16  0  78 
PRONAF 
Agricultural credit 









Economic and Social Context 
Poverty 
% of population 





hectare 1.093  0.526  0.175  3.534 
Population density 
Population density by 
state  63.166  94.914 0.038 440.744 
Conflicts 
Water conflicts  Number of conflicts  1.456  2.478  0  20 
Group fights 
Resistance actions 
Number of resistance 
actions per state 
related to land 




state related to land 
reforms 25  20  0  118 
Individual land conflict 
Murder attempt 
Number of murder 
attempts per state 
related to land 
reforms 2.617  5.422  0  32 
Death Threats 
Number of menaces 
per state related to 









Table 3: Results (dependent variable: Number of land occupations) 




















        0.009 
(3.15) 
Occupation t-2 
        -0.005 
(-1.32) 
Occupation t-3 



































































































































Alpha      0.163     
Nobs 
234  234  234  234  234 
Loglikelihood 
-1221.16  -1431.45 -2065.49 -1932.45 -2172.35 
Chi-Square 
Degrees of freedom 
Prob[chisqd>value] 
   392.56 
(0.000) 
  
The parameters in bold are statistical significant at 1%.  
 